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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
MARCI'S \V. JOHNSON d/b/a
MARCUS \V. JOHNSON
PL U:MBING AND HEATING,
Plaintiff and Appellant,
vs.

Case No.
11442

JOE DOCTOR~IAN, CELIA DOCTORi\IAN and HARRY J. DOCTORMAN,
Defendants and Respondents.

RESPONDENT'S BRIEF
S'I1A'rEMEN'T OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
Plaintiff-Appellant appeals an Order by the trial
judge vacating a Judgment and re-opening the hearing
for furtlwr testimony prior to entry of modified Findings and final Judgment. Plaintiff-Appellant appeals on
hrn grnnnds: 1 ) The trial court has no power to reverse
it~elf or to modify its decision after entry of Findings
of F'act, Conclusions of Law, and Judgment on a Motion
for a mm: trial; and 2) The trial court was in error, if
it had snch power, in reversing or modifying its Judgrn en t.
1

DTSPOSITION IN THE Lff\VER COURT
The disposition is stated substantially in plaintiffappellant's Brief.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Respondents seek to have the decision of the lower
court affirmed.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Respondents, owners of certain real propc>rty located at 2910-2912 Sonth Second \Vest, Salt Lake City,
Utah, held out to various builders and contractors in the
area the offer to permit them to build structures for
lease on the said property, provided any of them found
tenants who, under lease, were willing to occupy the
structures erected for them.
Quality Construction Company, by and through its
president, Franz Stangl, presented to respondent two
offers of lease wherein on<>, the plaintiff-appellant herein, a plumber, would agrt>e to occupy under lpase om~
of the structures to be built to his specifications under
terms where his services, as plumbing subcontractor on
both structures were to be applied as payment of the
first six months and the last six months of a five-year
period lease.
A value equivalent to $:3,000.00 of
rent paid was established between the parties. Mr. Stangl,
as a go between, ultimately procured thl' signatures
of parties to the leases and the signature of respondents
to a building eontract specifying the construction of a
building designed to appellant's s1wcifications. The lease
between appellant and respondents stated appellant was
to have occupancy by October 1, 1964.
2

APlwllant as snhcontractor in construction, actually
1wrfornwd tlw first work of laying sewer pipes prior
to the• ponring of a concrete floor after October 1 and
'
did almost tlH' last "·ork on the building, namely the installation of fixturPs. Appellant contributed somewhat
to the dPlay in the course of construction by withholding
dr•cisiom; affrcting the construction to his desires and
m·c·ds. During the lWriod required for the construction,
ap1wllant eithPr leased or purchased other quarters, but
Mver notified either .Mr. Stangl or respondents of such
lPaSP or of any intent on his part to terminate either the
1Pas0 or his participation as a subcontractor in the structure being built to his specifications.
To the contrary, appellant continued to occupy his
original premises to a date subsequent to his refusal to
occupy the premises prepared for him on the Doctorman
property.
lfr did not inform respondents of his intention not
to oceupy the premises until respondents made him a
tPml<T of possession when the building was completed.
At that tinw, plaintiff-appellant, informed respondents,
for the first time, of his intention not to occupy the
premises, and instituted suit for the $3,000.00 specified
in tlw leasP. Tlwreafter, after amendment of appellant's
Complaint, trial was held and Judgment was granted
nppdlant for the n•asonable value of his services.
Respondents, having filed their motion for a new
trial, after hearing, the trial Court took the action of
w hi eh appellant complains.
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AIWlT:\fENT
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT DID 1'\0T ERR IN VACATING THE
JUDGMENT ENTERED BY IT IN FAVOR OF PLAINTIFF
AND AGAINST DEFENDANTS.

It is with sonw chagrin that n•spond<>nts' attorney
notes his failun, to stat<' thP S}H'cifics of contend<>d error
to be grounds for a 1w\\· trial 1md(•r Huie 5!J(a) ((i & 7),
of the etah Rules of Ci,·il Proc('dtu·r, th(•s<' !wing:
(6) Insnfficirnc:· of thl· <'viclrne<' to justif.'· tlw \T('l'dict or other decision, or that it is against la\\·.
(7) l~rror in law.

If the Motion as snlm1itt<•d is ddretin, the tiinr to
protest is long sine(' goiw. Tht'I"l' is po\n•r in the Court
to grant a new trial or ,·acak .Judg11wnt on its o\\·n
initiative if tll<' interests of jnstic<' could so best he served, regardless of tlu· maim<'r h.'· which tlw PITor 1s
brought to tlw Court's a tt<•n tion-R 11IC' ;)9 (cl).
Respondent has no quarn•l with tlw law as eitPd
by aPiwllant, in Uptown Appliane<' & Hadio Co., Ine. Ys.
Flint et al., 1:22 Utah 2!JS, 249 P.:2d 8:2G; and Tangaro
Ys. Marrero, 13 U.:2d 290, :37:~ P.2d :390.
In the Uptown Applianc<' & Radio ea~w, whid1 cl(·alt
primarily with th<' ii,;sue of new trials, the Court dPcl<Ht>rl
at Pag<" 302:

"It lS axiomatic in this Stat<> that the d<'cision of the trial judg<> in rPfrrenee to tlw grnnt.
ing or r<,fusing of motions for nC'W trials is a
discretionary matter, JH'ovided then• is not an
abuse of discretion and th<>re is reason to helieH
that a miscarriage of justice would result if refusrd."
4

'1'he Tangaro easp does no more essentially than
eonfirrn the l-vtown A1lpliance case where it declares
in hPad note Xo. 2 at page 291:
'"Trial conrt has no discretion to grant new
trial absent showing of one of grounds specified
in rule. Hules of Civil Procedure, Rule 59."
In the instant matter, the Court on a motion for a
n<'W trial appar<'ntly detennined that sufficient testimony had lwen taken on plaintiff's case to base a judgrn<>nt; hut that tlw decision made and the Judgment entPr<>d thereon \\·ere in P1Tor; that there was no need for
an rntir<•l)· new trial hnt simply a re-opening of the
matt<•r for kstimony to be taken on defendants' Counterclaim.
The Court apparently felt that the Findings as made,
alld to the extent that they were made, were correct; and
that only additional Findings would be required to support a new Judgment, essentially in favor of the defenda n b-n•sponden ts.
It was already a matter of evidence taken to the
(•f frct that plaintiff-appellant had given no notice of
lm aclt or intent to terminate because of it. Further,
tlHT<· \nu; snfficient evidence b< fore the Court to the
1·lfrd that plaintiff-ap1wllant continued to work for and
c1 lH'linlf of tlw proj<•ct from which it sought to gain rem1t1wrntion to tlw ddriment of respondents.
1

F'or this r<'ason, all that was required of the Court
\\as to ord<'r the Jndgment vacated so that the same be
of no ]ll'<•jnclice to tlw party respondents, and order furtlil'l' tc:::t"mony to he tak<·n on repondents' Counterclaim
5

and the alljndiration of the 0quiti<'s of tlw parties against
each other to the end that final .Jnd.L,1111ent may be achieved.
Rule 59 (a) of the etah Rnles of CiYil ProcPdurr
adequatel~-, succinctly, and iwrtinPntly d<'als with thP
power of the court to act as it was lwre; suhjPct, ho"·ever,
to the requirenwnts as s<'t forth in tlH· rptown Appliance
and the Tangaro cast>s:
'' ( 1) Grounds. Subject to the prons10ns of
Rn le 61, a new trial ma~- lw granted to all or any
of the parties on all or part of the issues, for any
of the following cansps; pr01:irled, 710u:e1:er, that

on a motion for a 11eu- trial in au action tried
without a jury, the court may OJJrn thr .fudgment
if one has been c11tered, take additional testimony,
amend fi11dings of fact and co11clusio11s o/ law,
make new findings and conclusions and direct t71e
entry of a new judgment:"
In any case, the objection by the appellant to the
action of the Court in its difference from the specifir
wording of Rule 59 (a, 1) is essentially an exercise m
semantics. The Rules declares:
" ... the Court may open the Judgment if one
has been entered, take additional testimony,
amend the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of
Law... "
The Court ?;acatrd the Judgnwnt rather than openrd
the Judgment, and for this diffor<:>nce the app<:>llant cri<:>s
prejudicial error.
Appellant, on Page 12 of his Brief, insists that he
has found no casl' when• a trial Court r<"wrs<:>d its J udgment without making new Findings of Fact or Conclu-

G

s10ns of Law, or without having vacated the Judgment
and having taken additional testimony upon which to
mah new Findings and .Judgment.
H<>spon<lents contend that this has not been done in
tlw instant case. At this point, there has been no reversal
of .Judgm<"nt; only a vacating of the Judgment with the
dPelared intention of the Court to take further testimony
upon which additional Findings and a amended Judgment are to be based.
App0llant critieizes the action of the Court in sitting as a conrt of appeals "·ith respect to its own action.
Rf'spondents call attention to compiler's notes in the
Code of Civil Procednrf' under Rule 60( e) entitled Motion to Alter or Amend .Judgment on Page 661 Volume
9, Utah Code Annotated, 1953:
"This Rule had no counterpart in the former
Civil Code. The Rule was added to the Fed. Rules
as a result of the case of Boaz v. Mutual Life
Ins. Co., 149 F. 2d 321 where it was contended
that after the entry of its decision the trial court
had no way of correcting it.
"This Rule is similar to Fed. Rule 59 ( e)."
\Yitl10nt snch a rule or pmver in the Court to renr:-;(• ibwlf wlwre, in its wisdom, it saw fit to do so, the
lahorions and tedious procedure of appeal in each case
\rnnld lw required.
POINT II
WHERE EXAMINATION OF THE FACTS IS REQUIRED
EITHER IN SUPPORT OR IN ATTACK OF A JUDGMENT,
THE~ THE PARTY ATTACKING SUCH JUDGMENT HAS
THE BURDEN OF BRINGING THE TRANSCRIPT OF EVIDENCE ADDUCED AT TRIAL TO THE SUPREME COURT.
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E0!'sentiall)· th0 support or n•j0ction of the> act of
the trial court to d1'ten11irn• it-.; 11ltirnat1• pown to n·VPrR<' ib jndgmPnt in acc·m"<lane<' \\·ith tlw standards
set in thP cited l'ptmn1 Apphtn<'<' and Tangaro c·as<'s
will require an 1·xamination of t]1p transeript as a 1d10h".
'Vithout the transeript, th<' Snprrn1e Conrt mrnld
have no more than the stakmenb of facts in appellant's
and r0spondents' BriPfs from which to judge.
Bennett Leasing Company Ys. Da\'id ,J. Ellison et
al, 15 U. 2d; 387 P.:2cl :2-±G is a cas(· wh<'rt' ap1wllant
attacked a judgment on tlH· grounds that thP p1·idenc·p
does not snpport thP findings. The rtah SnprPlll(' Comt
on Page 7-± ch•clared:
" . . . 'Ylwn the amwllant attacks the judgment on the grnuncl that thP e1·idl'nce doPs not
support the findings, lll' has th<> burden of bringing a transcript of the p1·iclmcL' acldnct>d at tlH·
trial to tl1is court so the 11writ of his conkntioll
can he ascertairn•cl. 1']ip reeorcl brought to this
court consists onl:-· of the eomt fill' containing
the usual various pleadings, motions, ord<>rs, findings, and judgment; ... "
Responcl<"nts, howp1·1·r, \\·hil<· ealling att<•ntion to
this clPf Pct in appellant's app0al, 1rnnkl not opposP tlw
action of the Snpre111e ( 'ourt on thv suhstanti\·c i~:,;lw
raised h~- aprwllant's Point Il.
POINT III
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN HOLDING THAT
PLAINTIFF BREACHED ITS LEASE WITH DEFENDANTS.

Point 1, lrn·;ing denlt \\·ith tl1<• in:iat(' po1\·<·r in t!H·
Court to act, Point Jl I is corn·pnwd \\'itli 1d11'th<'r or ll(Jt,

s

granting s11el1 power, the Conrt was correct in its de-

cision to n•verse ihwlf and find for defendants-respondents herein.
Dd'endants han~ no substantial quarrel with apJi<'llant 's reeital in support of Point II except that respon<l(•nts find little of it related to the issue appellant preS(·nts. Hesriondents accept for the purposes of this appeal
tltc' Conrt's finding of the breach of the Lease Agreenwnt and that the said breach ·was material. Further,
n·s1Jomlents do not quPstion any statement of law submitted h~· aIJ}H'llant but contend that none is germane
to the specific issue raised by the act and decision of
the Court in its self renrsal.
The issue specifically is resolved as follows:
Assumt> the contract to be of a continuing nature
(a lPase of 5 ~·ears clnration). Assume a party to a contract is g-nilty of a breach of the contract. Assume furtlu·r tlw breach to be sufficiently substantial to warrant a
t(•nnination hy the injured party.
lT]l(l<'r thPse accepted facts, can the injured party
ahrnp:att> that contract or rescind it without giving timely,
unequivocal notice of his intent to rescind or terminate:
('an h(• fnrtlwr 1iroceed in such manner from which the
).n·ac·hing- party may reasonably assume that the injured
i '~uty i11t(•11ds to kPep in force and effect the contract
h(•t \\'('<'n the partiPs: reserving to himself the right to
gin notice of a rescission at his mvn convenience without
n·,":anl to cl('tri1m•nt to the breaching party? Respondents
tliink not.
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The law is fairly statc>d when it dcclan's the injured party to a contract has an Plection at the time of
the breach of contract, and for a r!:'asonable tinw thereafter, within which to waive the breach for purposes of
termination, and to continue with the contrad, seeking
reparations in damages for s11ch damage as was caused
it by the breach; or in the alternatiw, to rescind the contract by giving notice to the defaulting party of its intent to do so. This notice must be timely, clear unequin>cal in meaning, but must not necessarily be in writing. It
may be by act; it may be oral; it may he by action inconsistent with the purposes of the contract; it may be
by filing an Action in Rescission.
Thereafter, much of th<' law which plaintiff cites
in his Brief may apply. However, none of the cases cited
by the plaintiff deal directly with what defendants consider the pertinent issue here, namt>ly; ·what notice, if
any, and what need of notice, if any, was gin•n hy the
aggrieved party to the defaulting varty of its intent and
when was it given~
In each of the cases cited, an aggrieved party has
dedared to a breaching party in sustance; "You arc
breaching your contract; perform or else," and thereafter suit resulted on failure of the breaching party to
correct his breach.

In N akdimen vs. Baker ( C.A. 8 Ark.) 111 F 2d 778;
the defendant's agn•errn•nt was to sell and N akdinwn's
agreement was to buy 200 shares of stock at a stipulated
price payable by an installment Promissory Note over a
period of time, with certain assignments as security for
10

payment of the note. On default in payment, Baker imllwdiatt>ly started snit for damages \Vhich were the stipnlatPd vrice of the contract and prevailed. However, im111Pdia t<'l~· after suit was instituted, Nakdirnen reconsid<'n'd and offered the note and securities which were
refmwd by Baker. N" akdimen alleged this tender as a
d('frnse. It \ms in this context that the Court held a
party "·110 breaches cannot insist on specific performance
finee the filing of the action was a clear termination
of tlH' contract.
In Bnekrnan vs. Hill Military Academy, 190 Or. 194,
22:1 P.:2d 172; plaintiff sued on a note, security for which
was a tract of land. The terms on which the security was
lH•ld Jn·ovided that plaintiff would release a subdivided
lot with each $350.00 paid. Plaintiff refused to release in
aecorclance with this agreement after a demand by the
drfrndant-payor. rpon such refusal, defendant failed to
make any further payment. It was held in this case that
tiiPl"l' "·as a termination as a clear confrontation clearly
<1cli1wating the breach on the part of the plaintiff.

In Dalton vs. Mullins (Ky.) 293 S:W. 2d 470; there
was also a direct confrontation between the parties. In
this ease the Court declared "\Yhen Dalton refused to
wrt'onn the contract as written, Mullins had the right
fo tn·at this action as a hrt>ach, to abandon the contract,
to dqm rt from further lwrformance on his part, and
finally, (kmand damages."

In Loudt>nhack Fertilizer Co. vs. Tennessee Phosphate Co. ( C.A.6) 121 F. 298; and in Lynch vs. McDonald, 12 Ftah 2d 427, 3G7 P.2d 464; the tenor is essentially the sanw.
11

rr'he same is true in th<• Yazoo & ::\I. Yalh·,\· R Co.
vs. Searles, 85 l\li:::;s. 5:20, i17 So. 9i39. In this cmw, suit
resulted from a direct eonfrontation wh<>rt>in S<>arlP;,
required of the railroad that it switch cars to a privatP
siding. The railroad did so until St>arll:'s refus<'d to pay
switching and demurrage elrnrgt•s. 'l'hPreafter, the railroad rf>fosed to makP S]ll'cial s1\·i tching for Searles despite demands that they do so. 1'his breach resulted in a
law suit, and again the princi1ml was affirnwd that notice
of some kind before tE•nnination is n•quire<l after breach.
In 011r instant case, thf'n• was nothing in the natme
of confrontation. Both partiC's conceded that the,\· had
never met face to fac<·, or had an,\· cmn-ersation about
this contract until after construction was completC'd, and
defendants demanded of plaintiff that he take possession.
On the contrary, en•ry act of the plaintiff was consistent with compliance and conformity with thf> considerations of the contract by him to lw performed, giving not notice of his disaffection to the defendants.
Plaintiff cites 17 Am .•J m. 2d, and particularly SPes.
365, 425, 512 et seq. Respondents, through tlwir attorney,
haye no recourse hut to appron~ lwartily of the statements thPrein made, and to ohservf> that if tlic•y W<'l'e
not good law, they would prohahl,\· have not lwPn maclu
part of the text. Hm\·<,ver, the sections eikd are not
germane to tlw princirial, crncial issrn• which the respondents pres«nt here. \Ye particularly reftc•r to 17 Am.
Jnr. 2d; Contrnets, S<>cs. 508-509-510, whieh deal witl1
the issne lwre pnsent<•d.
The first srntence of See. 508, P. 988 of Contracts

12

declares, in s11l1stance, where one of the parties has not
pnfornwd, and is not ready and able to perform his
part of the agn~ernent on the day fixed, the adverse
part)· 11ia.\· consi<l<>r it at an end.
Section 509, Pg 990 declares in the first three sentencPs:
"Tlte failure of a party to perform his part
of a contract does not per se rescind it; the other
part)· must manifest his intention to rescind. If
the int<'ntion is rnanifested bv a notice must be
clear and unambiguous, conveying an unquestionable purpose to insist on the cancellation. A formal or written notice is not necessary, however,
although the law requires, on the part of him who
would rescind, some positive act which shows
snch an intention.
"If a party means to rescind a contract because of the failure of the other party to perform
it, he should give a clear notice of his intention
to do so unles8 the contract itself dispenses with
;-.;uch notice or unless notice becomes unnecessary
hy rea8on of the conduct of the parties. Hennessy
v. Bat:on, 137 rs 78, 3-± L. ed 605, 11 S Ct 17."

The first sentence of Sec. 510 states:
"nlanv cases have held that a right to rescind, ab{ogate, or cancel a contract must be
<·xercised promptly on discovery of the facts
from ~which it arises, and that it may be waived
Jiy unreasonable delay or by continuing to treat
tl.ie contract as a subsisting obligation."
In Fanington v. Granite State F'ire Ins. Co., et al, 120
l'tah }()~): :2:3:2 Pac. (:.2) 73-! the plaintiff sued insurance
company for co111pemmtion for fire damage. Defendant,

13

insurance company, refused payment, alleging recission.
A pertinent fact was the acceptance of an unpaid balance
of the annual premium b,\' defendants after the event of
loss. The Court declared on P. 119:

"One who claims a right to recission must
act with reasonable promptness, and if after such
knowledge, he does any substantial act which
recognizes the contract as in force, such as the
acceptance of more than half of the premium
would be, such an act would usually constitute a
waiver of his right to rescind."
9 A.L.R. 993 deals with the subject of the waiver
of the right to rescind for delay.
The trial court in its decision makes reference to
Cox vs. Berry, 19 U (2)d 352, 431 P2d 575. In this case
the court, while not spdling out specific estoppel, makes
a holding entirely consistent with the equitable doctrine
to the effect that one who is to receive the benefits of
an agreement must bear its responsibilities.
CONCLUSION
It would seem that appellant and r<'spondents have
little if anything to quarrel about in appellant's Brief.
Appellant admirably supports his contention that after
substantial breach, an aggrieved party may institute action for termination in one of two various forms or affirm a contract and seek for recovery of damages resulting from the breach.

None may quarrel with such a statement of the law.
However, respondents' view is that there is a requisite
to successful suit and that is notice of breach to the
14

party breaching. There seems no question that institution of snit could he such a notice of breach since it
crrtainly is an action which would apprize a breaching
part~·

of his dereliction, provided that such a suit is

brought timely under circumstances where its delay
would not in essence constitute a waiver of the right
to act on the breach or an estoppel to so act under circumstances where the delay can result only in gains to
tlw aggrievrd party and added detriment to the party
\\'ho has breached.
The appellant here having never by word or deed
given notice of any kind to respondents of his intentions
not to pursue the lease; and on the other hand, having
proceedPd to perform fully in terms of its contsruction
tommitments on the building being built specifically for
him and even making decisions of a unilateral nature with
I'<'S!Jl'd

to lmrtition placements among other details, has

tertainly waived any rights to proceed after breach if
any hy the rE'spondents or is estopped from contending
for such a breach.
There should be :r,io doubt of appellant's right to be
granted the reasonable value of his plumbing services
which the Court has found him nor is there any lesser
doubt that respondents, being deluded to the tremendous
loss of the entire construction cost of this building should
Le ('ntitl('d to recover the lease stipulated rentals as contracted for between the parties.
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Pstahlishing th<• dollar

such recovery against app<'llant that the Comt

prop<•rly <'Xt>rcisL•d its fnnrtion to n•op<·n th<• .J11dgrn<'11t

and take fnrtlwr tt>stimony.

Respeetfnll~·

snlnnitted,

Bernard L. Rose
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